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Directors' Duty to Obtain a Fair Price in the
Conversion of Nonprofit Hospitals
Eric S. Tower*
INTRODUCTION
The not-for-profit hospital' historically has played a central
role in the delivery of American health care. In 1991, tax-ex-
empt hospitals made up only one percent of all charitable orga-
nizations, but they accounted for over forty percent of all tax-
exempt organizations' revenues.2 In 1990, the value of federal,
state, and local tax exemptions to hospitals was estimated at ap-
proximately five billion dollars.3  However, changes in the fi-
nancing of health care have resulted in the transformation of
American health care away from community-focused, stand-
alone, nonprofit hospitals toward consolidated, for-profit, mul-
tihospital systems.4 Because the for-profit hospital industry has
already largely consolidated, proprietary hospitals are now ex-
panding by purchasing nonprofit organizations.
Anecdotal evidence suggests a possible pattern of abusive be-
havior in the governance of nonprofit organizations,6 including
* Eric Tower is an associate with the Washington, D.C., office of Smith, Read,
Shaw & McClay, LLP, where he practices with the Health Law Department. He re-
ceived his Master of Laws in Health Law from Loyola University Chicago School of
Law, his Juris Doctor from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, cum laude, and his
Bachelor of Arts from Northwestern University, cum laude.
The author thanks Professor Larry Singer of the Loyola University Chicago School
of Law Institute for Health Law and Matt Howley of Ernst & Young.
1. To avoid redundancy, this article uses the terms "charitable," "nonprofit," "not-
for-profit," and "tax-exempt" interchangeably throughout to designate corporations
that are exempt from taxation under section 503(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
("IRC"). These terms are technically distinct.
2. See Richard T. Schulze, Commentary, 4 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 263 (1991).
3. See John Copeland & Gabriel Rudney, Federal Tax Subsidies for Not-for-Profit
Hospitals, 46 TAX NoTEs 1559, 1560 (1990).
4. Ron Winslow & George Anders, Not-for-Profit Hospitals Tempt Public Con-
cerns: Many Are Takeover Targets As Nation's Big Chains Seek Ways to Expand,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1994, at A2.
5. Articles on this subject are numerous. See, e.g., States Review Oversight Activ-
ity As Non-profit Hospital Sales Increase, 4 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 861 (June 8,
1995).
6. See Charles B. Gilbert, Health-Care Reform and the Nonprofit Hospital: Is
Tax-Exempt Status Still Warranted?, 26 URB. LAW. 143, 155 (1994) (discussing several
recent scandals involving upper management of nonprofit organizations).
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nonprofit hospital sales of questionable propriety.7 One espe-
cially controversial incident involved the sale of fifty percent in-
terest in four hospitals to a major hospital corporation. Two
former members of the nonprofit hospital system's board of di-
rectors raised serious issues regarding the conduct of the sys-
tem's chief executive officer and the chairman of its board of
directors.8 They portray a CEO intent upon forcing a sale by
refusing possible management changes and other steps to avert
a sale. Moreover, the directors allege that they were denied suf-
ficient information upon which to base a decision-even to the
point that board members were not told the final sale price. 9
Finally, one director alleged that the board was not informed of
a higher offer by another purchaser. 10
Other recent questionable incidents involve an entire hospital
sale that was negotiated and consummated in less than four
weeks," a health system that fired twelve trustees of a local hos-
pital after they voiced opposition to an agreement with a major
for-profit corporation, 2 and allegations that hospital executives
personally benefited from sales to proprietary entities. 3 These
accounts raise serious concerns whether these sales are being
consummated for private gain rather than for the public good.
One common response to allegations of improper conduct of
the parties involved in the sale of nonprofit hospitals has been
that the hospitals were independently valued and that the final
sale price met or exceeded this valuation. This article examines
the valuation process and relates that process to the laws that
regulate the sale of a nonprofit hospital to a proprietary entity.
Flaws in the oversight of such sales are examined, and a solution
7. See, e.g., Adventist Health Care Sys. v. Nashville Mem'l Hosp., 914 S.W.2d 903
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); see also Andrea Gerlin, Hospital in Florida Is Focus of Probes
Tied to Scuttled Bid by Columbia/HCA, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1995, at B10 (detailing
allegations that the president of a Florida hospital intentionally devalued the hospital
in an attempt to sell it at an attractive price to a proprietary chain).
8. Sandy Lutz, How Much?: Price Is Becoming a Contentious Issue in Sales of Not-
for-Profit Hospitals, As Communities Seek Fair Value and Challenge Secrecy, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Feb. 12, 1996, at 85.
9. See id
10. See id. at 92.
11. See Alex Pham, New Orleans Battle Site of Hospital Takeover War, COM. AP-
PEAL, Sept. 17, 1995, at C1.
12. Editorial, Ceding Local Control Is the Price to be Paid for System Advantages,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 5, 1995, at 36.
13. See, e.g., Harris Meyer et al., Selling... Or Selling Out, Hosps. & HEALTH
NETwORKS, June 5, 1996, at 21, 28.
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is proposed to solve the problem of attaining an accurate valua-
tion of a nonprofit hospital.14
The sale of the assets of a nonprofit corporation is governed
largely by state law.' 5 In order to understand this body of law, it
is important to first understand the various ways a sale may be
structured. Typically, the sale of tax-exempt hospitals will fall
into one of four categories. Some hospitals will sell their assets
and remit the proceeds into an existing tax-exempt charitable
trust.' 6 Others will transfer funds into a newly created not-for-
profit corporation subject to charitable trust principles that will
make grants to support health-related projects in the hospital's
community.' 7 In some situations a multihospital corporation
will sell one of several community hospitals and keep the money
for its other operations.'8 One other variation consists of the
nonprofit corporation transferring its hospital assets to a for-
profit joint venture. The nonprofit receives cash equal to the
value of its contribution and remains a "passive" investor in the
joint venture.' 9 Regardless of the sale's structure, the valuation
of the hospital's assets is critical to the success of the transaction
since the proceeds from the sale of a tax-exempt hospital must
continue to serve a charitable purpose.20
I. THE VALUATION PROBLEM
In selling the assets of a hospital, as with any business, one
crucial step is to obtain an independent valuation report from an
14. Of course, there are many laws that may impact the sale of health care facili-
ties, including but not limited to antitrust laws, Medicare and Medicaid laws, state
licensure acts, certificate of need laws, labor and employment laws, and environmen-
tal law. This list is by no means exhaustive.
15. Currently, most oversight of the nonprofit corporations is left to the state.
See, e.g.,, States Review Oversight, supra note 5. However, there is proposed legisla-
tion by Representative Stark, D-Cal., that would impose significant federal oversight
over all conversion of tax-exempt hospitals. See Medicare & Nonprofit Protection
Act of 1997, H.R. 443, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (denying Medicare payment to
any hospital that does not demonstrate the fairness of the conversion process to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services).
16. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATION CONTINUING PROFES-
SIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM TEXTBOOK FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1996, 393 (1995) [hereinafter 1996 CPE TEXT].
17. Id at 394.
18. Id. at 303.
19. Robert A. Boisture & Douglas N. Varley, State Attorneys General's Legal Au-
thority to Police the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals and HMOs, 13 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REv. 227, 227 (1996).
20. See Daniel Coyne & Kathleen Kas, The Not-for-Profit Hospital as a Charitable
Trust: To Whom Does Its Value Belong?, 24 J. HEALTH & Hose. L. 48, 50 (1991).
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outside source.21 A valuation is the process of appraising the
"fair value" of the assets being sold, defined as the price at
which a rational seller with knowledge of the relevant facts
would sell the assets in an arm's-length transaction.22 Tradition-
ally, three different methods of corporate valuation are used:
cost or asset valuation, market comparison, and income or cash
flow determination.23 The cost method involves determining the
replacement cost of an asset. For a hospital, this means deter-
mining how much it would cost to build a new hospital, with an
allowance for depreciation. The market comparison approach
involves comparing the sale price of comparable assets or busi-
nesses.2 4 Finally, the most widely accepted methodology, the in-
come or cash flow method,25 involves projecting a hospital's
earnings potential.26 This valuation method is the most accepted
because the ability of a hospital to generate cash flow, i.e., the
going concern value, typically results in a much higher valuation
than simply valuing a hospital's hard assets.27 However, if there
is substantial local competition in a managed care market, cash
flow may be at a loss and may cause the fair market value to be
less than the book value of the assets. An appraisal report will
attempt to reconcile these three different methods to arrive at
an overall reasonable valuation. 28
The concept of value depends entirely upon context, exempli-
fying the law school adage that "the answer you get depends
upon the question you ask." A valuation for purposes of ob-
21. See Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 277 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Neb. 1979) (finding board
negligent for approving the sale of assets without obtaining an independent
valuation).
22. There is no definition of "fair value" for sales of nonprofit entities. This arti-
cle borrows the term from Delaware law. DEL. CODE Ar. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991); see
Charles Nathan & K. L. Shapiro, Legal Standard of Fairness of Merger Terms Under
Delaware Law, 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 44, 48 (1977); Michael Schwenk, Note, Valuation
Problems in the Appraisal Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 649, 653 (1994). There may
be other compelling definitions, but this article leaves that issue for discussion at an-
other time. For a discussion regarding different definitions of fairness, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be
Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.I. 27.
23. JAMES J. UNLAND, THE VALUATION OF HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CENTERS
2-3 (1993).
24. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983); Citron v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 495 (Del. Ch. 1990) (using market
comparison methodology to value business).
25. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712; Citron, 584 A.2d at 495; UNLAND, supra note
23, at 50.
26. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712.
27. See UNLAND, supra note 23, at 19.
28. See id. at 3.
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taining a loan or on behalf of a group of investors interested in a
hospital may be very different from one prepared for a hospital
considering a merger or sale. 29 Even valuations for purposes of
a sale may vary. For example, a hospital's value as an independ-
ent entity may differ from its sale price if auctioned off to the
highest bidder, or its sale price if sold following bilateral, arm's-
length dealings with a single potential purchaser.3° Ultimately,
any market valuation must also take into account the underlying
business fundamentals of a hospital, including market share,
utilization, quality of facilities, and cash flow.31 Other relevant
factors that may affect a hospital's value include the vitality of
the medical staff, trends in managed care contracting, payor mix,
and ease of entry of competition in the market.
In making a valuation, any analysis must make a variety of
simplifications, assumptions, and estimates. Because appraisers
simplify, assume, and estimate in different ways, all of which
may be reasonable and justifiable, it may be possible for the
same entity to have a range of different estimates of fair price,
depending upon who conducts the valuation.32 For this reason,
one can readily appreciate the exasperation that led one court to
declare: "Valuation is an art rather than a science. ' 33 This state-
ment aptly summarizes the opinion of many courts and legal
commentators who have pronounced considerable skepticism
regarding the valuation process. 34
Hospital valuations are, arguably, even more complex than
valuations of other entities because the nature of the hospital
industry presents unique problems. The health care market-
place has undergone, and continues to undergo, tremendous
structural changes. This state of constant flux makes any deter-
mination of valuation suspect. Hospitals are specialized, single-
use institutions, and each hospital is unique in terms of its size,
scope of services, condition of facilities, market share, and pa-
29. See id. at 30-31.
30. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 22, at 32.
31. UNLAND, supra note 23, at 50-51; see also Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74
A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950) (indicating that factors in valuing a corporation for purposes
of a "freeze-out" merger should include market value, asset value, dividends, earnings
prospects, the nature of the enterprise, and other facts that were known or could be
ascertained as of the date of the merger and that throw any light on the future pros-
pects of a merged corporation).
32. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 22, at 34.
33. In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1221 (Del. 1992).
34. See id. at 1221; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712; Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 22,
at 27; Schwenk, supra note 22, at 650.
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tient mix.35 Oftentimes a little-known factor called Medicare
gain/loss recapture may be the single most important factor driv-
ing a hospital's purchase price, an issue not present in other fa-
cilities or industries.36 These factors limit the usefulness of
traditional valuation methodologies such as the market compari-
son, cost, and income approaches.
Given the unique characteristics of hospitals, the market com-
parison approach to valuation is of little use. Sales of hospitals
are still relatively rare events, and hospitals that are merging or
selling are often financially distressed, meaning that traditional
valuation principles may not accurately measure the facility's
value.37 Several factors contribute to the problem of obtaining
an accurate value using the market comparison approach: the
number of potential buyers for a hospital is often, but not al-
ways, quite limited; there are significant regulatory and opera-
tional barriers to owning a hospital; and a hospital's assets are of
value only when the hospital is operated as a specialized ongo-
ing concern, unless the purchaser's objective is to shut the facil-
ity down and be rid of competition.38 Establishing market
comparisons to value a hospital is further hindered because the
terms of many sales are kept confidential. 39 Because there is a
limited "competitive market" for hospitals, each hospital must
be valued in its own context, and the use of comparative valua-
tion analysis is of marginal benefit. 4°
Similarly, the cost or asset valuation method also has severe
drawbacks as applied to health care entities. Land associated
with an existing health facility, or facility to be constructed, has
a special purpose with a value tied to the value of the facility
itself. For instance, a piece of real estate may be especially valu-
able to a hospital because of the patient mix of the surrounding
population. This means that it is difficult to value hospital land
35. UNLAND, supra note 23, at 4.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(o) (1994); 42 C.F.R. § 413.134(f) (1996). See, e.g., St.
Mark's Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n/Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah,
[1993-1992 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 41,304 (Provider
Reimbursement Review Bd. Feb. 19, 1993), affd, St. Mark's Charities v. Shalala, No.
93-C-565 S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20203 (D. Utah Nov. 4, 1996) (Magistrate's Report
and Recommendation), affd, No. 2:93-CV-0565-S, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 958 (D.
Utah Jan. 27, 1997).
37. See UNLAND, supra note 23, at 5.
38. See id.
39. See Lutz, supra note 8, at 85; David Segal, Hospital Venture Leaves Public in
Dark; Officials Shroud Arlington-ColumbiaIHCA Deal in Veil of Silence, WASH. POST,
Mar. 4, 1996, at F5.
40. UNLAND, supra note 23, at 4.
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and property as improved for "highest and best use" because
the hospital facility derives its value primarily from its special-
ized operations.'
Estimates based upon cash flows may also be problematic due
to the constantly shifting nature of the health care delivery sys-
tem in the United States. Because cash flow analysis, by its very
nature, depends upon a corporation's ability to generate future
earnings, an appropriate valuation must take nonspeculative fu-
ture events into account.4 2 Future estimates related to cash
flows include the future investment rate, new product develop-
ment, market competition, and the general political climate. 3 A
valuation must include a discount rate, based upon risk and
other factors that are highly subjective. 44 Using a cash flow
method to predict hospital revenues may be especially difficult
because of fluctuations in payment methodologies by third-party
payers.45 The discounted cash flow methodology does not pro-
vide enough information upon which to base a final purchase
decision for a complex organization such as a hospital. How-
ever, it can be useful in giving administrators and board mem-
bers an initial rough overview of value that is based upon
potential income at various assumed rates of return. 46
Although valuing any medical facility is difficult, the process
of valuing nonprofit hospitals is even more so. Ty pically, a large
proprietary company's value is established through the market
system, and a company's minimum value is reflected by the ag-
gregate value of its stock.47 To the extent that a company's
value increases or decreases, that change is reflected in the value
of its stock. Moreover, for-profit entities are, by definition,
profit seeking, maximizing the shareholder's return. A tax-ex-
empt entity is not valued through the free market, nor is it
designed to maximize profits. Indeed, tax-exempt hospitals
41. Id. at 14; see also Winslow & Anders, supra note 4, at A2 (discussing cultural
differences between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, which increases the difficulty
associated with nonprofit acquisition).
42. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
43. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 22, at 35.
44. Id.
45. UNLAND, supra note 23, at 20.
46. Id. at 50.
47. It may be possible for a company's value to exceed the aggregate price of its
stock in some situations, especially where a controlling block of shares is involved.
Hence, in some takeover situations there is a "control premium" offered. See, e.g.,
Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 388 (N.Y. 1979).
1997]
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must provide charitable care as a condition of being tax
exempt.48
It is important to recognize that a charitable hospital's worth
may not be reflected in its market value or in the revenues it
may generate. The hospital may have value because it exists to
fulfill a notion of community mission and purpose, including
providing charity care, education, or community service. 9 It
may be impossible to attach a true financial measure to a hospi-
tal that serves as the sole institutional provider of health care
services in a given community.
One final point related to valuation should be noted: some
scholars have theorized that the individuals making a valuation
may use their discretion in rendering opinions to serve the inter-
ests of the managers seeking the valuation. 0 Under this theory,
valuations will tend to serve the interests of those officers and
directors who selected those individuals making the valuation.5 '
This prospect is especially significant in the nonprofit realm,
where boards of directors may tend to be less involved in the
company's operations than boards of for-profit corporations.
II. LEGAL OVERVIEW
The conversion of any tax-exempt entity to for-profit use is
limited by three different sources of authority. Of primary im-
portance are state corporate and charitable trust laws. State law
imposes fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith on a
hospital's board of directors.5 2 Hence, each director must care-
fully scrutinize all facets of the sale to make an informed deci-
sion in the best interests of the community. A breach of these
duties may result in individual liability being imposed on the
hospital's directors.5 3 Additionally, a sale may trigger scrutiny
from attorneys general and/or courts because states often im-
pose restrictions upon the change in use of charitable assets
48. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
49. UNLAND, supra note 23, at 6.
50. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 22, at 37.
51. Id.; see also Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 (Del.
1991) (indicating that a valuation could be suspect because it depended entirely upon
information provided by defendants who were self-interested).
52. See MARILYN PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: LAW AND TAXATION § 4.04
(1985).
53. There are specific provisions for derivative suits in section 8.30(a) of the RE-
VISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION AcT (1987) [hereinafter RMNCA].
[Vol. 6
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under state trust laws. 4 Attorneys general in Michigan, Florida,
Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and California,
among others, have recently scrutinized hospital sales, in some
cases even obtaining independent appraisals of a hospital's
value before allowing a sale to proceed. 5 Finally, the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") may monitor a sale for compliance
with laws governing tax-exempt organizations.
Although these sources of law are intended to protect com-
munity assets, they may be insufficient to ensure that charitable
resources are used for the good of the community and valued
appropriately. Many commentators and public advocates have
argued that there is inadequate supervision of nonprofit corpo-
rations.5 6 Traditional principles of corporate law are of limited
applicability in the not-for-profit setting, and attorneys general
have multiple responsibilities and limited resources.5 7 The na-
ture of the nonprofit form, particularly in nonmembership cor-
porations, leads to self-perpetuating boards accountable to the
public, but with little actual public oversight.58 Finally, the IRS
is a relative newcomer to overseeing charitable activities 5 9 and
its enforcement powers are limited.
It is important to realize that directors of a charitable organi-
zation are more familiar than any outsider with that organiza-
tion, and they are likely to be the parties best able to put a
monetary value on that organization. 6° Indeed, even though
there are tremendous shortcomings in the operation of charita-
ble boards, the members of these boards have a crucial advan-
54. See Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304 (Conn. 1993); RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TRUSTS §399 (1959).
55. Kelley v. Michigan Affiliate Healthcare Corp., File No. 96-83848-C2 (Mich.
Cir. Ct., Ingham County, Sept. 5, 1996); 5 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1803 (Dec. 12,
1996); 4 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1473 (Sept. 28, 1995) (describing attorneys general's
responses to nonprofit conversion activity).
56. Meyer et al., supra note 13, at 24.
57. See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an
Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 668 (1985); see also NAT'L ASS'N OF Ar'Ys
GEN., COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., STATE REGULATION OF
CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND SOLICITATIONS 9 (1977) (indicating that, in 1977, it was
"doubtful" that there were sufficient personnel assigned to monitor charitable activ-
ity). More recent analysis of attorney general involvement in policing charities is un-
available, but in light of reduced government resources throughout the 1980s and
1990s, it appears reasonable to speculate that enforcement activities have failed to
keep pace with the growing number and worth of charitable entities.
58. Fishman, supra note 57, at 677.
59. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATT'Ys GEN., supra note 57, at 23.
60. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other
Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771 (1982).
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tage over the IRS and state enforcement authorities in that they
theoretically represent their community and should be familiar
with the operations of their organizations on an ongoing basis.
Valuation by other parties, including judges or appraisers, in-
creases the possibility of inaccuracies and the risk of corrup-
tion.6 ' Thus, although there is considerable anecdotal evidence
that board-level decision making regarding hospital sales has
tended to lead to undervalued assets, 62 a hospital's board of di-
rectors should play a crucial role in hospital governance; there is
no good reason to limit this role in conducting a sale. Instead,
until more effective methods of regulating charitable entities are
created, it may be best for the states to establish and enforce
rigorous procedural protections for hospital sales to ensure that
corporate boards properly exercise their duties of corporate
governance.
A. State Corporate Law
A tax-exempt hospital's board of directors must exercise fidu-
ciary duties of care and loyalty when selling the hospital.63
Although at one time the legal standard for directors of non-
profit corporations was uncertain because courts could not de-
cide whether to apply a trustee standard or the lower standard
of corporate law,64 the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act ("RMNCA") established that directors of nonprofit corpo-
rations are held to the more lenient corporate duty standard.65
The result of this shift is significant. The trustee standard histor-
ically attempted to ensure absolute loyalty through rigid
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Lutz, supra note 8, at 85.
63. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940); RALPH
FERRARA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION: BESIEGING THE BOARD
§ 5.01[1] (1996); James Edward Harris, The Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1993: Con-
sidering the Election to Apply the New Law to Old Corporations, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 1, 16 (1994); Michael Peregrine, Doing "Big Deals" and the Board's Duty
of Care, 28 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 327 (1995).
64. Committee on Charitable Trusts, Duties of Charitable Trust Trustees and Char-
itable Corporation Directors, 2 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 545 (1967); see also PHE-
LAN, supra note 52, § 4.04; Fishman, supra note 57, at 649 (indicating that the trustee
standard of care is more stringent than the business judgment standard now used for
directors of corporations).
65. RMNCA, supra note 53, § 8.30(e) cmt. 1. For an overview of the RMNCA's
impact upon charities, as well as a discussion of the attorney general's enforcement of
charitable standards, see Michael C. Hone, Aristotle and Lyndon Baines Johnson:
Thirteen Ways of Looking at Blackbirds and Nonprofit Corporations - The American
Bar Association's Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 39 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 751 (1989).
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prohibitions upon self-dealing and other conflicts,6 but corpo-
rate principles do not prohibit conflict-of-interest transactions
altogether, under the theory that some such transactions may at
times benefit the corporation. 67
Section 8.30 of the RMNCA establishes a duty of care that is
analogous to the for-profit standard.68 It provides that a direc-
tor must discharge his or her duties in good faith, with the care
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise
under similar circumstances, and in a manner the director rea-
sonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. 69
Moreover, under the "business judgment rule," when determin-
ing whether a director of a nonprofit corporation has acted ap-
propriately, courts presume that in making business decisions,
the directors of a corporation have acted in good faith and in an
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the
corporation.7° Comments in the RMNCA indicate that a board
should be subject to scrutiny under the business judgment rule
only where compliance with section 8.30 has not been estab-
lished.71 Moreover, pursuant to section 8.30, the standard of
conduct for a board should take into account the not-for-profit
nature of the organization as well as its own objectives and re-
sources. 72 These factors, combined with the historical deference
received by nonprofit boards due to recognition of their non-
profit status,73 effectively leads to a reduced standard of corpo-
rate duty.
The protections of the business judgment rule are available
only when directors have fulfilled their duty of loyalty.74 With
respect to a proprietary company, a director's loyalty may be
questioned if the director stands to receive a substantial per-
sonal benefit from, or to be substantially harmed as a result of, a
66. Fishman, supra note 57, at 648.
67. PAT CHEW, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY 77 (1996).
68. RMNCA, supra note 53, § 8.30; see also MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT § 8.30(3d ed. 1979) (analogous section applicable to for-profit corporations).
69. RMNCA, supra note 53, § 8.30(a).
70. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64
(1917).
71. RMNCA, supra note 53, at 216.
72. Id. at 214.
73. HOWARD L. OLECK & MARTHA E. STEWART, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS,
ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS 889 (1994); Peregrine, supra note 63, at 327.
74. FERRARA ET AL., supra note 63, § 5.03[2].
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particular business decision.75  However, section 8.31 of the
RMNCA limits the applicability of the business judgment rule
to specific categories of conflict-of-interest transactions that may
raise questions with respect to a director's loyalty. These in-
clude situations where a director (1) has a "direct" interest in
the transaction (such as where the director himself is participat-
ing on the other side of the transaction); (2) is a general partner
in a partnership or a director, officer, or trustee of another en-
tity that has an interest in the transaction; or (3) has a material
interest in an entity that has an interest in the transaction.76 In
all other situations, a director must act "in good faith ... in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation. ' 77 The relatively narrow conflict-of-in-
terest provisions of section 8.31 remove directors from scrutiny
for breach of loyalty in many situations that could arguably af-
fect their judgment. For example, a director may have received
an offer of employment with the prospective purchaser, contin-
gent upon consummation of the sale of the hospital to that pur-
chaser, or the purchaser may indicate that it will provide
"golden parachutes" to key officers. Here, the RMNCA's con-
flict-of-interest provisions will not be triggered, and rather than
bearing the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction, the
directors will be entitled to the deference afforded under section
8.30.78
The validity of appraisals conducted at the behest of individu-
als who stand to benefit from a particular transaction is fre-
quently questioned. Much of the law in this area has been
created as a result of squeeze-out mergers, where some of the
owners or participants in a business enterprise use strategic posi-
tion, inside information, or powers of control to eliminate one
or more other owners or participants from the enterprise.
75. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified in
part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984);
FERRARA ET AL., supra note 63, § 5.03[2][a].
76. RMNCA, supra note 53, § 8.31 cmt. 1.
77. Id.
78. The IRS recently issued a Sample Conflicts of Interest Policy that would ad-
dress some of these concerns. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATION
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM TEXT-
BOOK FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997, at 25 (1996) [hereinafter 1997 CPE TEXT]. However,
although the 1997 CPE TEXT provides insights into the IRS's position with respect to
these issues, the IRS has yet to take action against any person or entity with respect to
actions that would breach this policy, and as a result, it is impossible to ascertain
whether this policy will have a significant impact on board behavior.
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Often, the context of these cases is a merger between a corpora-
tion and its controlling stockholder, which typically appoints one
or more directors of the merged corporation. In these situa-
tions, courts recognize that there is a potential to understate
value because insiders stand on both sides of the transaction. 79
Courts have stated that the weight to be ascribed to expert
valuations necessarily depends upon the assumptions underlying
them.80 A valuation may thus be questionable because the data
supporting it may, in some instances, be provided by individuals
of dubious loyalty.81 In addition, two commentators have identi-
fied strong incentives, including monetary benefits, for apprais-
ers to render opinions serving those interests of officers and
directors who wield the power to select the appraisers and to set
their compensation arrangements, in other words, the manage-
ment of the entity they are valuing.82
Courts recognize the vagaries of the valuation process. Thus,
in reviewing a squeeze-out merger, a court will examine the "en-
tire fairness" of the merger, including the facts and circum-
stances behind the merger ("fair dealing") and whether the
terms of the merger are fair to the minority shareholders ("fair
price"). 8 3 Courts have even gone so far as to examine the ac-
tions of "independent" committees in interested merger transac-
tions.84 As one court stated: "The controlling stockholder
relationship has the inherent potential to influence, however
subtly, the vote of minority stockholders in a manner that is not
likely to occur in a transaction with a noncontrolling stock-
holder. 81 5 Accordingly, in squeeze-out mergers, a court does
not simply accept a valuation, but it reviews every aspect of the
transaction to ensure fairness.
Applying the rigorous standard utilized in reviewing squeeze-
out mergers to sales of nonprofit hospitals could significantly de-
crease the possibility that hospitals will be undervalued. Manag-
ers of nonprofit corporations wield enormous power, and often
79. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LExis 259 (Oct. 19, 1990), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
80. See Cavalier Oil Co. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1143-44 (Del. 1989).
81. Alabama By-Products v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 257 (Del. 1991).
82. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 22, at 37.
83. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115-16 (Del. 1994);
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
84. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117-18; Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584
A.2d 490, 501 (Del. Ch. 1990).
85. Citron, 584 A.2d at 502.
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they are unchecked by their boards of directors.8 6 As a result,
hospitals may be sold in transactions that appear to be legiti-
mate, but that are instead initiated at the behest of a few inter-
ested individuals. Such a result is made even more likely by the
relatively lax conflict-of-interest standards contained in the
RMNCA (or similar state laws governing nonprofit corpora-
tions), which do not preclude managers who may benefit finan-
cially from a sale from participating in sale deliberations.s7 Any
valuation or transaction conducted at the behest of individuals
who stand to gain from a transaction is questionable and should
be viewed from an "entire fairness" perspective.8 8 In the con-
text of a sale of assets, the RMNCA and other corporate laws
fail to establish sufficient standards of conduct to ensure proce-
dural fairness and reduce the risk of undervaluation. An entire-
fairness standard of review would reduce these possibilities.
B. Attorney General Review
While the actions of nonprofit directors are subject to corpo-
rate standards of conduct, the assets of a tax-exempt entity itself
are governed by state charitable trusts laws. 9 When property is
given to a charitable corporation, the corporation is under the
same duty as a charitable trust to devote that property to speci-
fied charitable purposesf 0 Two commentators contend that
court approval and attorney general review are necessary pre-
requisites for the sale of any nonprofit hospital.91 Although
there is some authority that supports this position, the prepon-
derance of authority vests in the directors of a nonprofit corpo-
ration the discretion to sell hospital assets in furtherance of the
charitable mission of the corporation. 92
It is generally settled that a court of equity has the power to
authorize a sale of trust property contrary to the intent of the
86. Fishman, supra note 57, at 674-75.
87. RMNCA, supra note 53, § 8.31.
88. This approach contrasts with the approach taken by the IRS, see supra note 78
and accompanying text, which requires disclosure of any interests an officer or direc-
tor may have related to a hospital sale, but which will allow a sale if it is accompanied
by an "appropriate" valuation.
89. See WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, Scorr ON TRUSTS § 348.1 (1989); Fishman, supra
note 57, at 649-50.
90. Fishman, supra note 57, at 651.
91. Boisture & Varley, supra note 19, at 227.
92. FRATCHER, supra note 89, § 348.1.
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trust,93 and that a state attorney general, as the representative of
the public or those specially benefited, has the right to protect
or enforce charitable trusts.94 This power may be derived from
either specific statutory authority or common law.95 Even
though many states require nonprofit corporations to provide
some notice to the attorney general before selling all or a sub-
stantial portion of their assets, these notice provisions do not
expand the power of the attorney general to police sales beyond
the law of charitable trusts.96
As a general rule, the law of charitable trusts empowers direc-
tors of a nonprofit hospital to sell property if the sale of that
property plausibly furthers the organization's purposes and is
not subject to a donor's restrictions.97 The manner of the sale is
within the discretion of the trustee.98 The standard of review for
trustees is highly discretionary. When a trustee acts in good
faith, with proper motives, and within the bounds of reasonable
judgment, a court will not interfere with the trustee's judg-
ment.99 Under this standard, a court or an attorney general may
be powerless to stop a sale unless the hospital's funds are donor
restricted. 100
In some instances there may be a restriction that requires
court involvement, such as a requirement not to sell donated
land or a provision that a gift must be used in the operation of a
hospital.' 10 Even when there are donative restrictions on chari-
table gifts, a court may find that the hospital's board of directors
has an implied power of sale if the sale furthers the hospital's
93. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 381 (1959); C.T. Foster, Annotation,
Constitutionality, Construction, and Effect of Legislation Authorizing Sale of Charita-
ble Trust Property, 40 A.L.R.2d 556, 559 (1955).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959); R.E.H., Annotation, Who
May Maintain Suit or Proceedings to Enforce or Administer Benevolent or Charitable
Trusts, 62 A.L.R.2d 881, 882 (1929).
95. GEORGE BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 742 (rev. 2d ed.
1980); FRATCHER, supra note 89, § 399 note 2.
96. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5913 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-3-
1202(g) (1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 355.656(7) (Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-2-
617(7) (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-12-02(g) (1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 65.534(7)
(1995); RMNCA, supra note 53, § 12.02(g).
97. M. Gregg Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1035, 1136 (1992).
98. FRATCHER, supra note 89, § 190.6.
99. Id. §§ 187, 190.6.
100. Id. § 187 (indicating that a court will not control a trustee's discretion as long
as the trustee does not exceed the bounds of reasonable judgment).
101. Id. § 187.
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charitable purpose.1°2 As a result, an attorney general may be
powerless to stop a sale that is deemed necessary by a hospital's
board of directors.10 3
Although an attorney general may lack the power to prevent
a sale, the law of charitable trusts is clear that any charitable
assets should be sold at maximum price. In furtherance of this
requirement, the selling party should attempt to secure competi-
tive bidding and take other steps to sell the property at the
greatest possible advantage. 1°4 This makes sense, because an in-
dependent valuation conducted at the behest of an attorney gen-
eral may depend upon information provided by the managers of
the hospital that is for sale. As discussed above, the resulting
appraisal may be of questionable use. Worse yet, an independ-
ent appraisal may be conducted without the cooperation of the
hospital's management, resulting in increased costs and risk of
inaccuracies. 05 Utilizing the competitive bidding process mini-
mizes these concerns. Furthermore, courts tend to give
credence to sales utilizing the competitive bidding process. 1°6
An appropriately conducted auction of a section 501(c)(3)
hospital to the highest bidder eliminates most valuation
problems. 1°7 Because bidders will be competing against each
other, their bids should reflect some of the synergies that they
expect as a result of the sale. The result should be that the final
sale price should exceed the value of the hospital as a stand-
alone entity. Moreover, such a sale would also mitigate the in-
centive of insiders to devalue a hospital in order to align them-
selves with a particular purchaser.10 8 In light of the difficulties in
102. BOGERT, supra note 95, § 741.
103. A newly enacted Nebraska law, entitled the Nonprofit Hospital Sale Act,
specifically empowers the attorney general to approve the purchase of any nonprofit
hospital. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20104 (Supp. 1996). Similar legislation has been en-
acted in California. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5914(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997). Other
jurisdictions are also considering enactment of similar legislation. See, e.g., Conver-
sion Bill Requires Prior Notice for Non-Profit and For Profit Transfers, 6 BNA's
HEALTH L. REP. 507, 507 (Apr. 3, 1997).
104. BOGERT, supra note 95, § 745.
105. See Levmore, supra note 60, at 771.
106. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del.
1986); Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 22, at 32.
107. The IRS has regarded the bidding process favorably in several private letter
rulings. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-19-066 (Feb. 12, 1982); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-18-127 (May 9,
1984); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-38-026 (June 26, 1995).
108. Of course, this solution depends upon the ability of a hospital to solicit a
sufficient number of bidders to obtain truly competitive bids and minimize the possi-
bility of collusion. The author recognizes that this may be difficult to do in some
circumstances.
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the valuation process, an attorney general may credibly make
the argument that a hospital has not been sold for maximum
price as required under the law of trusts unless there has been a
competitive bidding process.
Of course, selling a nonprofit hospital to the highest bidder
might undermine the mission of the tax-exempt entity. As dis-
cussed earlier, a hospital's sale does not extinguish the mission
of the tax-exempt entity where charitable assets remain follow-
ing a sale. The selling entity must continue to serve its mission
by operating other facilities or by establishing a charitable foun-
dation to serve others. Another means for the seller to ensure
the continuation of its charitable mission is to base the sale upon
factors such as commitment to charitable care and respect for
religious or charitable tradition. Such considerations may justify
a hospital accepting a lower bid from an entity that agrees to
continue some or all of the hospital's charitable mission.
On the other hand, it is also important to recognize that crite-
ria unrelated to price can increase the possibility of an abuse of
discretion related to the sale. One means to mitigate this prob-
lem somewhat would be to assign a weight to all criteria before
soliciting bids. These criteria would be distributed along with a
request for proposals, contingent upon approval of the attorney
general.
C. The IRS's Response
1. Tax Overview
Most nonprofit hospitals obtain federal income tax exemption
through section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Review Code. In order
to receive an exemption under section 501(c)(3), an entity must
be organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
educational, scientific, or literary purposes. 1' 9 Under the organi-
zational test, the organizational documents of a section
501(c)(3) entity must limit it exclusively to the performance of
exempt purposes and must provide that upon dissolution the en-
tity's assets be distributed for one or more exempt purposes. 110
Hospitals qualify for section 501(c)(3) exemption because they
109. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). State tax exemption uses different tests, but largely
relies upon federal standards. However, standards for property tax exemption may
be tied directly to the charitable contribution a hospital makes to its community. See,
e.g., Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (1996).
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promote health, a purpose that the IRS has recognized consti-
tutes a charitable purpose in and of itself."'
In addition to meeting organizational requirements, a tax-ex-
empt hospital must be careful to ensure that it operates solely
for a charitable purpose. That is, it must operate within the pa-
rameters of the private inurement and private benefit tests. "In-
urement" occurs whenever a person in a position to influence
the decisions of an exempt organization (an "insider") uses in-
fluence to distribute revenues from the organization in a manner
that does not further the exempt purpose of the organization. 1 2
No part of the net earnings of an exempt organization can inure
in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or indi-
viduals. Even a minimal amount of inurement may result in dis-
qualification of exempt status."13
Hospitals must also comply with the "private benefit" test.
The scope of the term "private benefit" is much broader than
that of "inurement" in that it applies to a benefit received by
any person."14 Any private benefit a tax-exempt organization
confers must be merely "incidental" to its charitable activities.
The test requires that the private benefit be incidental in both a
qualitative and a quantitative sense. To be quantitatively inci-
dental, the private benefit must be insubstantial, measured in
the context of the overall exempt benefit conferred by the activ-
ity." 5 To be qualitatively incidental, the private benefit must be
a necessary concomitant of the exempt activity, in that the or-
ganization's exempt objectives cannot be achieved without nec-
111. Id.; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (enumerating specific criteria that a
hospital must meet in order to qualify as a §501(c)(3) organization). Although the
IRS has, in some isolated instances, qualified hospitals that do not meet all the criteria
of Rev. Rul. 69-545 for exempt status, the criteria established in that ruling are the
basis upon which the vast majority of hospitals rely to secure their tax exempt status.
112. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (1996). This definition may be extremely
broad. For example, the IRS has taken the position that all physicians on a hospital's
medical staff are "insiders." Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Apr. 24, 1986). Interestingly,
the term "insider" does not appear anywhere in the tax code, but it has been bor-
rowed from federal securities law. BRUCE HOPKINS, Tim LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT OR-
GANIZATIONs 266 (6th ed. Cum. Supp. 1996); see also Thomas K. Hyatt, Recent
Developments for Tax-Exempt Organizations, 2 ANNALS HEALTH L. 79 (1993)
(describing recent judicial and policy developments impacting nonprofit health care
organizations).
113. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS EXAMINATION
GUIDELINES HANDBOOK § 333.2(2) (1992).
114. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1996).
115. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,762 (Oct. 13, 1988); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec.
18, 1978); see HOPKINS, supra note 112, § 13.7.
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essarily benefiting certain private individuals.116 Thus, the fact
that a physician uses a hospital's operating room, equipment,
and personnel, without any charge, to make a substantial profes-
sional income is only an incidental private benefit.
The sale of a tax-exempt hospital may violate proscriptions
upon inurement or private benefit in many different ways. For
example, an insider, such as the chief executive officer of a hos-
pital, may have a financial interest in the proprietary entity
purchasing the hospital. Unless the sale is at "arm's length," the
use of the insider's influence to effectuate the sale for his or her
own benefit constitutes inurement. Moreover, the sale of a tax-
exempt hospital may be problematic if the hospital is underval-
ued, because a sale under these conditions would create a pri-
vate benefit that is more than merely "incidental."
Until recently, if the IRS discovered inurement or greater
than incidental private benefit, its sole remedy was to revoke the
501(c)(3) status of the hospital. 17 In the sale of a hospital, this
loss of exempt status could be retroactive to the date of the sale,
resulting in the imposition of a tax on the sale itself as well as
subsequent activities of the previously tax-exempt hospital. 118
Also, loss of tax-exempt status could result in the taxation of
any previously exempt bonds issued by the hospital under the
authority of section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code, meaning
that any interest paid on the bonds would be subject to taxa-
tion."19 The penalty of revoking tax-exempt status is severe and
may only harm the individuals served by the charity and its
bondholders. As a result, the penalty is rarely used and may not
be an adequate incentive for directors to properly oversee the
conduct of a corporation's affairs. These sanctions are far less
prohibitive than those for private foundations, where the IRS
has the power to impose penalty taxes on the management and
116. HOPKINS, supra note 112, § 13.7.
117. THOMAS HYATT & BRUCE HOPKINS, TAx-EXEMPT HEALTHCARE ORGANI-
ZATIONS 296 (1995) (noting that the IRS does not have a process for "de-recognizing"
exempt organizations, but instead that a tax-exempt organization may lose its tax ex-
emption only by violating one or more aspects of the organizational or operational
tests).
118. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-30-002 (Mar. 19, 1991).
119. I.R.C. § 150 (1994); see also Rev. Proc. 93-17, 1993-1 C.B. 507 (providing
remedial action that can be taken to prevent a change in the use of proceeds from an
issue of government bonds from being treated as violating the Internal Revenue Code
tax-exempt interest provisions).
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"disqualified persons" who benefit at the foundation's
expense.20
The IRS itself recognizes that its ability to adequately police
public charities is limited.12 1 To remedy this shortcoming, the
IRS successfully lobbied for the ability to impose penalty excise
taxes, called intermediate sanctions, where a 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion engages in "excess benefit transactions," with the taxes im-
posed upon the individual who benefits improperly and upon
the organization's management. 122 The IRS has not yet pub-
lished regulations implementing these intermediate sanctions,
and how stringently the IRS will police such transactions is not
yet known.
2. Historical Response to Sales
In overseeing sales of tax-exempt hospitals, the IRS has his-
torically maintained a hands-off policy. Early IRS letter rulings
relied upon Revenue Ruling 76-91, pertaining to a nonprofit en-
tity purchasing hospital assets from a proprietary corporation. 123
In this ruling, the IRS stated that "[g]enerally, where an organi-
zation purchases assets from an independent third party, a pre-
sumption exists that the purchase price (arrived at through
negotiations) represents fair market value." 24 The ruling did
note, however, that this presumption is not valid when a close
relationship exists between the purchaser and seller, or where
one controls the other. In such a situation, the tangible assets
should be valued by an independent appraisal. The purchasing
exempt organization then must justify its purchase of the intan-
gible assets in light of its exempt purpose and the value of those
intangible assets.' 25
Relying on the presumption of an arm's-length transaction es-
tablished in Revenue Ruling 76-91, in the early 1980s the IRS
approved the sale of several nonprofit hospitals despite the lack
of a professional valuation. 26 These rulings were characterized
by substantial confidence in the independence and abilities of
120. I.R.C. § 4941 (1996).
121. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES BY EXECU-
TiVE TAX FORCE, COMMISSIONER'S PENALTY STUDY 32-33 (Feb. 21, 1989).
122. I.R.C. § 4958 (1996).
123. Rev. Rul. 76-91, 1976-1 C.B. 149.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-18-127 (May 9, 1984); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-19-066 (Feb. 12,
1982); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-52-099 (Sept. 30, 1981). It should be noted that these rulings
were all issued prior to amendments to the Anti-Kickback Statute. Since the IRS has
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nonprofit boards, and they do not discuss the relationship be-
tween the parties except to characterize the transactions as
"arm's length.' 1 27 Another characteristic of the early IRS letter
rulings is a failure to focus upon the post-transaction interac-
tions between the parties, 28 ignoring both the possibility of the
tax-exempt hospital becoming a de facto subsidiary of the ac-
quiring for-profit hospital's operations and the potential inure-
ment problems related to the employment of key officers,
administrators, or directors.
In 1983, a particularly troublesome transaction occurred that
highlights the difficulties presented by an "independent" valua-
tion conducted at the behest of insiders. Members of the board
of directors of a nonprofit Florida hospital purportedly sought
to purchase the hospital to obtain capital to expand the facility.
The board indicated that the hospital would be sold at its ap-
praised value, and that an independent appraisal would be ob-
tained using a qualified appraiser. The board further
represented that it would use arm's-length standards to ensure
that in future dealings with the for-profit hospital, any benefits
would not be offered on terms more beneficial than could be
obtained from unrelated third parties. The IRS relied on these
facts, approving the sale in early 1983, and the directors
purchased the hospital for $8.3 million. 129 Subsequently, the
hospital added thirty-one beds, using a certificate of need that
was issued when the hospital was tax exempt, and obtained ap-
proval for thirty-six additional beds. In October 1985, the direc-
tors sold the hospital for approximately $29.6 million, meaning
that each of the twelve directors of the hospital received in ex-
cess of $2.3 million after a little more than two years of
ownership.
In August 1987, the Florida Attorney General sued the hospi-
tal's directors, alleging that the $8.3 million purchase price was
not fair and reasonable.130 The IRS also initiated an investiga-
tion, including commissioning an appraisal of the hospital. Us-
recently tied tax exemption to compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute, boards
must now also be cognizant of these prohibitions.
127. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-18-127 (May 9, 1984) (relying on a competitive bid process,
outside consultants, and the knowledge of the hospital's board of trustees).
128. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-12-125 (Dec. 20, 1982) (proceeds of trust funded solely by
90% of a nonprofit hospital's sale could be used to pay for indigent care at the
purchased, now for-profit hospital without constituting self-dealing).
129. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-30-002 (Mar. 19, 1991).
130. Carol Gentry, State Suing Anclote Officials over Hospital Sale, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Aug. 6, 1987, at 4B.
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ing three different valuation approaches, the appraisal valued
the hospital at approximately $24 million at the time of the sale
to the directors. The IRS concluded that the directors had not
paid fair market value for the hospital and noted that the hospi-
tal's accumulated earnings over the years had been used to build
up the physical facilities, reputation, and goodwill that were
transferred to the directors through the original sale. The IRS
ruled that based upon the board's apparent lack of fiduciary re-
sponsibility, it was not entitled to rely upon the initial private
letter ruling. The IRS then revoked the hospital's section
501(c)(3) status retroactive to the date of the hospital's sale.
Apparently, the only reason this transaction received scrutiny
was because the directors did not wait longer before selling the
hospital. If the initial "independent" appraisal was flawed, as
the IRS later believed, was this due to the fact that the apprais-
ers relied upon information supplied by the board of directors,
or because of flaws inherent in the valuation process itself?
That is, either the appraisal process itself may at times be arbi-
trary, or it is subject to such influence by insiders that it is essen-
tially meaningless in some situations.
More recent IRS private letter rulings appear to indicate scru-
tiny of the process behind hospital sales. For example, in 1995,
the IRS issued another ruling related to the sale of a tax-exempt
hospital.13 1 The hospital was suffering financial difficulties aris-
ing from its lack of affiliation with one of the two networks in its
service area and its inability to obtain managed care contracts.
The hospital's board solicited bids from twenty unrelated health
care organizations. There were four responses to the solicita-
tion, and two proprietary entities submitted bids.
The hospital board's subsequent actions drew attention pri-
marily because it spurned the highest bid in favor of an entity
that the board believed offered a greater geographic diversity, a
much larger base of operations, a wider range of services, and
greater access to insurance contracts and patients. The board
apparently believed that sale to the lower bidder would better
ensure the hospital's long-term survival in accordance with its
charitable mission. In this case, the hospital represented to the
IRS that the final sale price was five times earnings before inter-
est, taxes, depreciation, and amortization ("EBITDA") for the
previous fiscal year. In its correspondence to the IRS, the hospi-
tal indicated that the current value for comparable transactions
131. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-38-026 (June 26, 1995).
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involving privately held hospitals was from four to six times
EBITDA, although it apparently did not provide information
concerning the higher bid. The IRS ruled that the hospital's sale
would not jeopardize the 501(c)(3) status of the hospital's hold-
ing company.132
The IRS's reliance upon an outside valuation, as demon-
strated in the 1995 private letter ruling, may fail to adequately
protect charitable assets from undervaluation. The use of an
EBITDA valuation alone, based upon past earnings of the hos-
pital, contradicts established principles of valuation, which em-
phasize using projected cash flows. Further, the valuation
apparently failed to take into account the individual dynamics of
the hospital in question, including market share, utilization, and
quality of facilities. For example, an EBITDA valuation may
fail to take into account the impact of a significant new managed
care contract, the demise of a competitor, the creation of a new
service, or other factors that may result in the improvement of
the hospital's future competitive position in the market.
Although EBITDA multiples may be a valuable tool in apprais-
ing a hospital, relying exclusively on EBITDA to establish value
is questionable.
3. The IRS Today
Possibly in response to the increasing sales of nonprofit hospi-
tals, the IRS recently issued its 1996 Exempt Organization Con-
tinuing Professional Education Technical Instruction Program
Textbook ("1996 CPE Text") providing the first published over-
view of the factors the IRS will consider in monitoring sales of
nonprofit hospitals. 133
The IRS will consider the following factors in assessing the
validity of the sale of nonprofit hospitals:
" Fair Market Value The IRS requires an assertion that the
hospital has been sold for fair market value, using informa-
tion required in the valuation of medical practices for acqui-
sition purposes.
" Funding of Projects The IRS will attempt to ascertain
whether a foundation will be created to support indigent
132. Id.
133. The provisions in the 1996 CPE TEXT, supra note 16, are permissive insofar
as failure to meet them does not constitute a per se violation of the regulation gov-
erning tax-exempt hospitals. However, they do provide insight into the IRS's view on
the process that should accompany any sale. A hospital sale that does not meet the
standards enumerated in the 1996 CPE TEXT will be more likely to face IRS scrutiny.
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and Medicaid services at all local health care providers, es-
pecially where the foundation's commitment to direct medi-
cal care is equivalent to what the section 501(c)(3) hospital
provided in the past. Disproportionate payment to the pur-
chaser of the exempt hospital may be a negative factor in
ruling on an exemption.
" Side Deals No "insiders" should receive direct or indirect
payments to induce the sale.
" Limitation on Providers The foundation created with sale
proceeds should make grants to all hospitals and health care
providers in the community.
* Minority of Financially Interested Directors Participation
in the foundation by representatives of the for-profit pur-
chaser should be limited to a minority of the foundation's
board of directors.
" Term Limitations There should be provisions for the rota-
tion of foundation board members to encourage member-
ship representing various segments of society and to ensure
that the for-profit hospital does not enjoy a disproportionate
amount of support from the foundation.
" Conflict of Interest Policy The foundation's bylaws should
clearly identify possible conflicts of interest.
" Compensation from the Sale There must be extensive de-
tailing of all payments, commissions or other arrangements
involving any insiders, such as severance packages. The
nonprofit's board minutes should reflect any type of com-
pensation flowing from the sale and provide supporting evi-
dence demonstrating that it is reasonable."M
The 1996 CPE Text section on valuation addresses many of
the deficiencies of previous private letter rulings discussed
above. However, it is important to remember that the 1996
CPE Text focuses on the process of selling a section 501(c)(3)
hospital-it does not purport to examine the specificities of the
valuation, the deliberative process underlying a sale, or the
choice of to whom a 501(c)(3) hospital should be sold. The un-
derlying assumption of the 1996 CPE Text is that the hospital's
board exercises its fiduciary duty to ensure that the best inter-
ests of the community are served when it meets the stated crite-
ria in the process of selling.
In addition, although the 1996 CPE Text contains a detailed
discussion of valuation issues, the validity of its methodology is
diminished somewhat because it is entirely reliant upon issues
arising with regard to physician practice valuations. By analo-
134. 1996 CPE TEXT, supra note 16, at 394-97.
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gizing hospital valuations to physician practice acquisition valua-
tions, the 1996 CPE Text fails to take into account numerous
factors that may significantly impact the hospital valuation
process.
In valuing a physician practice, the 1996 CPE Text focuses
upon EBITDA, basing projected revenues upon "normalized"
financial statements. 35 Factors used in projecting future cash
flow include changes in revenue, patient volume, and expenses
based upon existing market conditions, growth, and inflationary
trends. 36 The emphasis on projected, rather than historical,
earnings is significant because use of historical earnings has
been highlighted as one way in which hospitals may be
undervalued. 137
Unfortunately, reliance upon EBITDA without taking into
account the individual characteristics of a hospital may paint a
distorted picture of the hospital's value as a proprietary entity.
Physician practices, because they are proprietary entities, have
different objectives than nonprofit hospitals. As a charitable en-
tity, a hospital may support some services even though they do
not produce sufficient revenues to justify the continued provi-
sion of those services. It may support these services through re-
stricted use funds or by subsidizing them with revenue from
other operations. 38 Such charitable endeavors can actually re-
duce a hospital's valuation if based solely upon a cash flow anal-
ysis. This raises a crucial issue: when valuing a hospital, should
the hospital be appraised based upon the assumption that its op-
erations will continue unchanged, or should it be valued assum-
ing that it is operated to maximize profits? A valuation that
fails to account for elimination of services may allow a proprie-
tary entity to reap a windfall gain at the expense of the hospi-
tal's community.
Another problem with analogizing hospital sales to physician
practice acquisitions is that it fails to encourage valuations to
account for synergies or efficiencies that may arise from the sale
135. Id. at 418, 420. Normalized statements are financial statements that are ad-
justed for unusual or nonrecurring items.
136. Id. at 418.
137. Lutz, supra note 8, at 94.
138. See Peter Mitchell, Florida Journal: Chains Show Hospitals Can Turn a Profit,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1995, at F1 (noting that not-for-profit hospitals bear the burden
of providing high-cost services such as bum, trauma, and neonatal intensive care
treatment, as well as providing care to poor and indigent patients, while proprietary
hospitals focus upon the most profitable patients).
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of a section 501(c)(3) hospital to a larger corporation. Thus, a
hospital may be worth more to a larger corporation than its
stand-alone value because the corporation may be able to oper-
ate the hospital more efficiently, or because the newly acquired
hospital may enable the corporation to provide new services. 139
However, as the Anti-Kickback Statute relates to physician
practice acquisitions, it precludes assumptions related to many
postacquisition synergies because such assumptions might con-
stitute a payment for illegal referrals of Medicare or Medicaid
patients. 140 In valuing physician practice acquisitions, the IRS
has focused upon appraisals that assume practices will continue
as free-standing entities;141 such assumptions may be necessary
to prevent abuses in physician practice acquisitions. However,
these assumptions as applied to hospitals may result in underval-
uation and potential windfall gains to proprietary corporations.
The result is that the IRS may receive information indicating
that a section 501(c)(3) hospital has been sold for "fair market
value" when, in fact, the process of valuing the hospital has
failed to establish a value reflecting efficiencies and synergies
that can be generated.
III. TOWARD A PROCESS-ORIENTED SOLUTION
TO VALUATION
The examples mentioned above lend credence to arguments
that some nonprofit hospitals have been undervalued when sold
to for-profit entities. If such is the case, it may be due to the
combination of poor oversight and the difficulties inherent in
the valuation of nonprofit hospitals. The simple truth is that it
may be impossible to ever arrive at a value reflecting the impor-
tance of a nonprofit hospital to its community. However, it
139. In the area of mergers, courts have long recognized that a merger produces
synergistic effects that result in the merged corporation being worth more than the
sum of the two previous corporations. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239,
1248 (7th Cir. 1977). Although the sale of a nonprofit hospital is distinct from a
merger, the synergies of such a sale should generate benefits to the purchasing corpo-
ration. In the absence of such synergies, the purchaser would have little incentive to
buy the hospital.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2) (1994); see also Letter from D. McCarty
Thornton, Associate General Counsel, Office of the Inspector General, Department
of Health and Human Services, to T.J. Sullivan, Technical Assistant, Office of the
Associate Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 22, 1992), reprinted in 2
BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 245 (Feb. 25, 1993) (noting that payments in excess of fair
market value may be construed as payments for referrals).
141. 1996 CPE TEXT, supra note 16, at 394-97.
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should also be clear that the value of a hospital is at least its
stand-alone value under discounted cash-flow methodology, us-
ing projected EBITDA. A hospital may be worth much more if
its operations can be restructured or because of resulting merger
synergies.
Most directors of nonprofit corporations have a strong com-
mitment to their communities, and one can presume that they
want to do what is appropriate. The problem is that appropriate
board behavior cannot be guaranteed. 42 Part of the solution to
maximizing hospital value may be educational. That is, directors
should be provided sufficient guidance to assist them in maxi-
mizing the hospital's value.143 The development of appropriate
standards of conduct is also necessary to ensure that the sale
benefits the community and furthers charitable purposes. In ad-
dition, early involvement of the attorney general in the sales
process is necessary to ensure that the sale inures to the benefit
of the community.
Appropriate standards of conduct related to hospital sales
may be derived from Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Com-
pany,'" another squeeze-out merger case related to the acquisi-
tion of Remington Arms Company by E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Company. The merger was approved by an independent, dis-
interested committee of Remington directors who had never
been affiliated with or employed by DuPont. The committee or-
ganized itself and chose its own legal counsel and financial advi-
sors. Moreover, the committee did not discuss its activities with
Remington management without the prior approval of its coun-
sel. As a result, the decision-making process was untainted, and
no Remington director affiliated with DuPont participated in
any of the committee's deliberations or attempted to influence
its decisions. Similar standards of conduct could ensure the in-
tegrity of a sale where officers or directors of a nonprofit hospi-
tal may have received employment offers for an entity
purchasing the hospital, or where a foundation may be created
as a result of the sale. In addition, as discussed above, a hospi-
tal's assets should be sold only after the completion of a compet-
itive bidding process, based upon fixed criteria upon which bids
142. Fishman, supra note 57, at 648.
143. California recently issued guidelines that will require nonprofits seeking to
convert to prepare a health impact statement and to demonstrate that they have con-
sidered alternatives to conversion. Review Guidelines Established for Nonprofit Con-
versions, 6 BNA's HEAL-n L. REP. 104, 104-05 (Jan. 16, 1997).
144. 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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will be evaluated. Bids should be evaluated by independent di-
rectors, and by no means should the hospital be sold for less
than its appraised value unless the community receives some
other value as a result of the sale.
There may be some, if not many, situations where a competi-
tive bidding process is impractical or fails to procure a sufficient
number of bids. In such situations, the likelihood of collusive
behavior between hospital management and a potential bidder
may increase dramatically. Here, it may be necessary to obtain
an independent appraisal; while expensive, it may prevent mil-
lions of dollars in lost revenue and tens of thousands of dollars
in attorneys' fees. This appraisal should not only value the hos-
pital as a stand-alone entity, but it should also reflect structural
changes (including management changes) that the hospital could
make to increase its value. In addition, the hospital's possible
worth to a particular bidder should be analyzed.
Finally, in all situations, the sale price of a hospital should be
fully disclosed to the community, with as much detail as is prac-
tical. Disclosure will enable other hospitals to make better mar-
ket comparisons of their value, and it will discourage excessive
benefits to insiders. The current standard of nondisclosure does
not benefit communities or other nonprofit hospitals. As guard-
ians of community assets, directors and officers of nonprofit hos-
pitals have a duty to take steps that will benefit their
communities.
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